Developing an evaluative framework for industrial policy in Ireland:fulfilling the audit trail or an aid to policy development by Lenihan, Helena et al.
   
 1
 
DEVELOPING AN 
EVALUATIVE 
FRAMEWORK FOR 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN 
IRELAND: FULFILLING 
THE AUDIT TRAIL OR 
AN AID TO POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT? 
Helena Lenihan, Mark Hart and Stephen Roper*
 
 Evaluation is one of the buzzwords of current day parlance in 
Irish policymaking circles.  It is one of those words (like sustainable 
development a number of years ago) to which everyone claims 
allegiance, but few actually know how to define, let alone 
operationalise. More often than not the discussion rarely moves 
beyond the need to ensure transparency and probity in the allocation 
of public funds. What we set out in this paper are the key 
components of a framework for evaluation which seeks to provide 
an assessment of the impact of public sector interventions and, more 
importantly, arrive at some sense of how particular programmes and 
initiatives contribute wider economy effects. 
1. 
Introduction
For the purpose of this paper, evaluation is defined as the 
process of assessing the level of ‘additionality’ associated with a 
particular policy intervention, and our primary focus will be at the 
micro or firm level. The essence of the term additionality is that a 
policy intervention should bring about a level of economic activity 
* The authors are based at the University of Limerick, Kingston University and 
Aston Business School, Birmingham respectively.  
(e.g. increased employment, improved productivity etc.) in excess of 
what would have happened in the absence of the intervention.     
It has been estimated that approximately €5.5 billion was spent 
on direct financial assistance to industry by government agencies 
(excluding administration and support to the higher education 
sector) over the period 1980-2003.1 Given the scale of this 
expenditure it would seem pertinent to address the very basic issues 
of ‘accountability’, ‘value for money’ and ‘additionality’. Despite this 
level of expenditure on industrial development, there has, and as is 
subsequently argued in this paper, continues to be a poor evaluation 
culture in Ireland although some progress has been made in recent 
years. 
The paper will review the regime of evaluation in Ireland which 
has been associated with these industrial policy interventions by a 
number of agencies in the last two decades. Section 2 begins by 
examining the fundamental question of – ‘Why evaluate?’ This is 
followed in Section 3 by a review of Irish industrial policy evaluation 
studies and an examination of  Ireland’s weak record of evaluation, 
whilst acknowledging the fact that, of late, some improvements have 
been made. This, of course, raises the question of why such a poor 
evaluation culture exists in Ireland. This is explored in Section 4.  
Drawing on the international literature, Section 5 then focuses on 
the key issue of what best-practice, or at the very least good-practice, 
evaluation entails. Section 6 concludes with recommendations for 
developments in evaluation practice in Ireland.    
 
 Evaluation, even in its most basic form is needed to ensure ‘value 
for money’, and that issues of ‘accountability’ and the ‘opportunity 
cost’ of spending public resources are taken into account. Good 
evaluation of policy interventions should therefore ensure that 
standard notions of cost efficiency and cost effectiveness are 
achieved. As ESRI (1997) suggests “…the opportunity cost of public 
funds is high.  All public spending must be measured on a 
competitive basis against the best alternative use of funds” (p.xv).  In 
these terms, financial assistance to industry may be more amenable 
to evaluation than other types of ‘softer’ supports. The fact that 
money is a measurable input, and that financial assistance (grant) 
may involve dedicated personnel, facilitates measurement 
(Georghiou, 2002). Moreover, significant resources have been spent 
on Irish industrial policy interventions in the form of grants, and 
more recently by financial aid through equity or preference share 
finance and loan guarantees. Data obtained from Forfás (2004) 
suggests that over the period 1980-2003 approximately €5.5 billion 
was provided by the four Irish industrial development agencies (i.e. 
Enterprise Ireland, IDA Ireland, Shannon Development and Udarás 
2. 
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na Gaeltachta) in the form of grant payments and equity 
investments.2  
The interventionist role played by the Irish government in 
promoting industrial development through financial assistance to 
firms has been significant.  Private equity investment, including seed 
and venture funding was very limited during the 1980s and early 
1990s. The latter 1990s witnessed a substantial increase in private 
equity investment in Ireland, with payments increasing from €17.8 
million in 1996 to €32.8 million in 1997. The year 2001 saw the 
highest amount of equity payments, while once again there was a 
drop off in these types of payments in 2002 and 2003.  
The Irish government’s interventionist industrial policy has a 
long history. The first significant references to industrial policy were 
as far back as the Industrial Relations Act, 1946, and the Industrial 
Research and Standards Act, 1946. In this protectionist era, grants 
were targeted at indigenous industry with the first form of grant 
support to indigenous industry in 1952. Four years later, the 
Industrial Grant Act, 1956 expanded the level and range of support 
provided to industry by allocating grant aid to industrial 
development nationally (i.e. outside of the areas to which the 
Underdevelopment Areas Act, 1952 applied).  This was followed by 
the Industrial Grants (Amendment) Act, 1963, which introduced 
training grants and grants for the expansion or adaptation of an 
industrial undertaking. The Research and Development (R&D) grant 
scheme was introduced with the passing of the Industrial 
Development Act, 1969. In each case, grants and tax incentives were 
seen as a way to “…help offset the disadvantages associated with our 
peripheral location in Europe and the absence of a large home 
market” (Government of Ireland, 1984, p. 6).   
More recently, significant funding has been allocated to industrial 
development under the various Operational Programmes for 
Industry (co-financed by the EC). Even the most recent policy 
documents (e.g. Forfás, 2000) continue to place emphasis on 
financial incentives to industry. Admittedly, however, the focus is 
different, with emphasis on ‘capability building’ rather than ‘capacity’ 
expansion and support for applied R&D (Enterprise Strategy Group, 
2004). The same report also stresses the need for the development 
of enterprise-led networks and suggests the allocation of a budget of 
“€20 million per annum for five years from existing enterprise 
development agency resources to support enterprise-led networks to 
foster collaboration in defined areas of activity” (p. xvii). This 
suggests that there has been, and continues to be, a wide range of 
2 It should be noted however, that the above does not provide the complete 
picture.  For example, according to Enterprise Ireland’s report for 2003, its total 
expenditure was €230 million, however, direct financial support to companies as 
recorded on the BIS was only €83 million which is thus only a component of 
overall total expenditure by the agency concerned. The other main costs include the 
whole administration of EI (national offices, international offices etc.) and support 
to the third level sector (various science and technology programmes etc.).   
industrial policy interventions in Ireland. This alone, purely on cost-
effectiveness and value for money grounds, is reason enough to 
evaluate the impact of such interventions.   
Anderson (2000) states that evaluation should assist with both 
the design and implementation of programmes. A related point is 
made by McEldowney (1997) and Sanderson (2002) who argue that 
good evaluation is not an end in itself but rather a way in which 
policymakers improve the design and delivery of policies.  
Georghiou (2002) makes a related point when he argues that 
“…policy evaluation provides the most systematic approach to 
learning” (p.1).   
 
 This section provides an overview of Irish ex post evaluation 
studies at the micro or firm level. Our contention is that a key focus 
of evaluation is concerned with measuring the level of ‘additionality’ 
associated with a particular industrial policy intervention so in this 
section we focus on those studies which address the issue of 
additionality.   
3. 
Irish Industrial 
Policy 
Evaluation 
Studies 
As far back as the “Third Programme for Economic and Social 
Development” (1969-72) a call was made for evaluation: “A proper 
evaluation can be made only in light of the R&D objectives which a 
country sets itself, some of which are more costly to realise than 
others” (Government of Ireland, 1969, p.153). The “White Paper on 
Industrial Policy” (Government of Ireland, 1984) also emphasised 
the importance of ‘reviewing’ and ‘monitoring’ industrial policy. 
Similarly, the Culliton Report (1992) highlighted the need for broadly 
based evaluation policy: “Formulation and evaluation of policy for 
industry needs a broader approach than has been adopted in the past 
… Judging whether value for money is being obtained remains 
difficult without in-depth, independent ex post evaluation of a type 
which is only beginning to be done” (pp. 9-10). The Operational 
Programme (1994-1999) also emphasised the importance of 
evaluation: “Effective monitoring is also necessary to ensure that 
commitments are honoured and programmes implemented in an 
agreed manner” (Government of Ireland, 1994, p. 141). More 
recently, Forfás (2000) also make reference to evaluation – “The 
shift from ‘capacity building’ to ‘capability building’ support will 
require commensurate upgrading in the evaluation methodologies 
used by the development agencies…” (p. x).   
We now review some Irish evaluation studies to illustrate that, 
despite calls for industrial policy evaluation, it was not until the mid-
1990s that evaluations of industrial policy interventions at the firm 
level really began in earnest. The increased impetus for evaluation 
during the 1990s was largely driven by the European Union (EU) 
who emphasised the need to assess accountability and the impact of 
significant EU transfers. A recent report undertaken for the 
European Commission set out in some detail a review of the 
methods employed to review the effectiveness of State aid to SMEs 
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(Mosselman and Prince, 2004).3 This review of evaluation practice 
across the Member States of the EU demonstrated a variety of 
approaches with many States falling well short of accepted best 
practice standards.  In the case of Ireland it was acknowledged that 
the Government had by 2004 put a system in place whereby all State 
interventions were evaluated.  However, there was no assessment of 
the quality of those evaluations.   
A key element of each of the Irish evaluations has been the 
assessment of what would have happened in the absence of 
assistance, requiring a consideration of the concepts of deadweight 
and displacement  Jointly, these concepts allow an assessment of the 
additional impact of any policy intervention.4 There appears to be 
little confusion regarding the meaning of the term displacement.  
This is widely held to be the degree to which output from an assisted 
firm displaces output from existing firms in the market place. This is 
certainly not the case regarding the concept of deadweight, however.  
Some of the confusion may stem from the fact that the term 
‘deadweight’ in the evaluation literature does not have the same 
meaning as the term ‘deadweight loss’ in the mainstream economics 
literature.5  
Even within the evaluation literature, confusion exists as to what 
deadweight really means. Some studies refer to the concept as 
deadweight spending. For example, Picard (2001) “…deadweight 
spending – also called windfall gains – refers to the gains that firms 
make from the subsidies; in the MES scheme, deadweight spending 
is directly related to the non-additional jobs that unduly receive a 
subsidy” (p. 522). Heijs (2003) adopts a completely different 
terminology, referring to the deadweight phenomenon as ‘free-rider 
behaviour’. He defines free-rider firms as “…those supported firms 
whose innovative efforts do not depend on public aid and probably 
would or could have carried out the same level of innovative activity 
without public support” (p. 446).6  
We have always taken deadweight to mean the degree to which 
economic activity (e.g., increased sales or productivity) at the level of 
3 The EIM report by Mosselman and Prince also provides a thorough review of the 
range of evaluation approaches that have been developed over the years and sets 
out in clear terms what is considered to be ‘best practice’. 
4 Evaluation should also take account of the other key (positive) components 
additionality, that is, multipliers and linkages but it is beyond the scope of this 
review to examine the latter two components. 
5 The term deadweight loss in economics is normally associated with discussions of 
taxation in public sector economics. For example, Connolly and Monroe (1999) 
define deadweight loss as “A measure of the loss of economic efficiency associated 
with the imposition of a tax” (p. 196).  Rosen (2005) employs a similar definition 
“Because a tax distorts economic decisions, it creates an excess burden – a loss of 
welfare above and beyond the tax revenues collected.  Excess burden is sometimes 
referred to as welfare costs or deadweight loss” (p. 304). 
6 However, McEldowney (1997) argued that although the concepts have much 
validity, it is in their application and treatment that problems and challenges may 
occur. 
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the firm would have happened in the absence of intervention by 
public agencies. 
EX POST  EVALUATIONS 
To what extent has ‘additionality’ been incorporated into Irish 
evaluative approaches? Box 1 summarises the findings of a selection 
of the most significant evaluation studies that have been carried out 
since the mid-1990s.  The Irish deadweight studies have been useful 
in terms of understanding and deriving headline estimates of 
deadweight. They have also highlighted the contribution that can be 
made to policy development by detailed evaluation studies. In the 
Irish case, a sufficient amount of evidence regarding the extent of 
deadweight now exists to suggest that this is an issue that should be 
addressed by Irish industrial policymakers.   
However, Lenihan (2004) has argued that it is not sufficient to 
merely derive estimates of deadweight and displacement and to 
discuss their consequences. A further methodological innovation 
was undertaken by Lenihan (2004) in her Shannon Development 
study which estimated a Logit regression model to assess the 
likelihood of a firm to report deadweight. The results suggest that 
grant type, size of firm, whether the investment appraisal included 
grant and whether the firm was a first-time or repeat grant recipient 
all impacted significantly on the level of deadweight.   
Box 1: Irish Ex Post Evaluation Studies 
The Economic and Social 
Research Institute (1997) 
Referring to the various individual 
Community Support Framework 
(CSF) mid-term evaluations, 
several major areas of concern 
emerged including deadweight and 
other unintended side-effects. The 
authors make the point that the 
Industrial Development Operational 
Programme (OP) is not only one of 
the largest in the Community 
Support Framework (CSF) but also 
one of the most complex. Although 
not providing any definite insights as 
to precisely how deadweight and 
displacement might be measured, the 
study nonetheless firmly highlights 
the significance of the concepts.  
  
Industrial Evaluation Unit 
(1999a) 
 
 
 
  
A meta evaluation of R&D policy 
and interventions briefly addresses 
the issue of deadweight but does not 
discuss the measurement of the 
concept.  Deadweight was addressed 
under the heading “Common 
Evaluation Themes” and it was 
estimated to be approximately 50 per 
cent, and there was only passing 
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reference to displacement. 
 
Industrial Evaluation Unit 
(1999b) 
This study of the evaluation of micro 
enterprise supports across national 
and local development agencies, also 
addresses deadweight.  The IEU 
observes that no definitions of 
deadweight and displacement are 
provided by the County Enterprise 
Boards and therefore the assessment 
of deadweight is left to the discretion 
of the evaluation sub-committees.  
Nevertheless, the study derives a 
deadweight estimate of 45 per cent 
but does not provide a quantitative 
estimate of displacement  
 
Industrial Evaluation Unit 
(2000) 
In a study of the evaluation of the 
Seed and Venture Capital scheme, 
the estimate of deadweight within the 
scheme was estimated to be around 
60 per cent. 
 
Lenihan (1999; 2004) These studies have incorporated the 
concepts of deadweight and 
displacement. The methodological 
approach adopted was that of the 
self-assessment approach, involving 
in-depth face-to-face interviews with 
the managing directors of firms that 
received grants from Shannon 
Development in 1995. The 
definition of deadweight takes 
account of the various degrees or 
levels of deadweight as measured by 
time, location and scale.  This 
facilitates estimates of ‘partial’ versus 
‘pure’ degrees of deadweight. 
• Deadweight estimates: 53 
per cent of firms reported 
‘pure’ deadweight, with only 
10.4 per cent reporting ‘zero’ 
deadweight.   
• When the partial deadweight 
assumptions and categories 
are accounted for, the overall 
deadweight estimate rises to 
78.4 per cent.   
• Displacement was estimated 
at 4.2 per cent.  
 8
  
Fitzpatrick Associates 
Economic Consultants 
(2003) 
The study reviewed the role of 
County and City Enterprise 
Boards and raised concerns about 
the net impact of supports for micro-
enterprise including dead- 
weight and displacement. The study 
arrives at an estimate of 30 per cent 
for pure deadweight and 60 per cent 
for partial deadweight.  The study 
also employed what is referred to as a 
‘less direct way’ to estimate 
deadweight by asking recipient 
companies how they would have 
performed in the absence of 
Enterprise Board assistance. The 
study arrives at a pure deadweight 
factor of approximately 27 per cent 
and a partial deadweight factor of 
about 41 per cent.  Regarding 
displacement, the study found that 57 
per cent of turnover emanated from 
the home country of the promoter, 
with a further 33 per cent emanating 
from the rest of Ireland.  They 
conclude by stating that this points to 
a potentially higher level of 
displacement than that estimated by 
Lenihan (1999).  
  
Lenihan et al. (2003); 
Lenihan and Hart (2004) 
The impact of financial assistance to 
indigenous Irish firms from 
Enterprise Ireland for the period 
2000 to 2002 was assessed. The study 
estimated deadweight to be between 
46.2 and 55.8 per cent.  Estimates of 
displacement were estimated to be 
between 4.4 to 12.2 per cent.  
 
In terms of the models of evaluation practice outlined in Storey 
(2000) in relation to policy to support small business (see Box 2) it 
would appear that at best Ireland is hovering around Step 3.7  
Having said this, a number of the normal drawbacks associated with 
Step 3 such as the ‘respondents’ effect, whereby respondents may 
either purposely exaggerate the effect of assistance (for fear that they 
 
7 In defence of Irish evaluators it should also be acknowledged that employing 
control groups in the Irish case is extremely difficult. As Forfás (2003) outline 
“…since the vast majority of industrial projects are grant-aided in Ireland, we lack a 
control group of non-grant aided firms that would be used to assess the impact of 
grants” (p. 33). 
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may not receive assistance next time round) or downplay the effect 
of assistance (wanting to attribute success of their business to their 
own personal characteristics and vision etc.) and also the problems 
associated with timing have been overcome in much of the work of 
Lenihan (1999; 2004); Lenihan et al. (2003) and Lenihan and Hart 
(2004).  
Box 2: Storey (2000) Six Steps of Evaluation 
Step 1: Assess the take-up of schemes by eligible participants.  
According to Storey (2000) “…Step 1 serves an accounting or legal 
function but plays no economic role” (p. 181).   
Step 2: Assesses recipients’ opinions. For example, in the case of 
firms that received financial assistance for a particular project, they 
are asked for their views regarding the likely impact of assistance.  As 
Storey (2000) outlines “…Step 2 seeks to obtain the viewpoint of 
firms, both on the effectiveness of the scheme and on its 
accessibility”. However, such questioning only of participant firms 
fails to estimate the extent to which firms were discouraged from 
participating in a scheme…Of paramount importance is that the 
views are sought of all relevant businesses – whether or not they 
applied” (p. 183).   
Step 3: Assesses recipients’ view of the difference made by the 
assistance. In the main Step 3 seeks to determine whether the 
recipient felt that the specific policy intervention made a difference 
and if so, to try to quantify this ‘additionality’ (e.g. in terms of 
additional jobs, profits, sales etc). In more ‘sophisticated’ Step 3 
analyses, firms may also be questioned regarding issues of 
deadweight and displacement.   
Step 4: Comparison of the performance of assisted firms and 
control groups. As Storey (2000) outlines “The effect of policy is 
therefore defined to be the difference between what actually 
happened and what would have happened in the absence of the 
policy” (p. 185).  
Step 5: Comparison of Match Firms. This involves researchers 
identifying a specific control group with which to compare the 
assisted businesses.  Matching of firms is based on factors known to 
influence the performance of firms.   
Step 6: Taking account of selection bias. The objective of step 6 
is to compare assisted with matched firms, whilst taking account of 
the potential for assistance to be targeted at firms which would have 
exhibited either above or below average performance without 
assistance. 
 
 
Despite rational arguments for engaging in thorough policy 
evaluation, there seems historically to have been a poor culture of 
evaluating industrial policy interventions in both policymaking and 
academic circles in Ireland.  This is all the more surprising given the 
relatively strong tradition of evaluation in the UK, and the strong 
historical links between policy and research communities in Ireland 
4. 
Why Does 
Ireland Have a 
Poor 
Evaluation 
Culture? 
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and the UK. Some connections are found, however. For example, 
Taylor (2002), citing Foley (1992), suggests that “Given the long 
tradition of regional policy in the UK, it is not surprising to find that 
there has been considerable interest in developing evaluation 
methods” (p.173/174).  In fact, Taylor (2002) argues that interest in 
policy evaluation in the UK began in the 1960s (through the work of 
Needleman and Scott (1964) and McCrone (1969), and that UK 
evaluation gained momentum in the 1970s following the seminal 
articles of Moore and Rhodes (1973; 1976).   
One possible explanation for the failure of the Irish 
evaluation/policy community to follow the UK tradition may be the 
characteristics of the Irish economics research community. In 
particular, although macro-economic analysis has a strong tradition 
in Ireland, applied micro-economic analysis – particularly industrial 
micro-economics – is less well developed. The ESRI, for example, 
has over the years maintained a sizeable research team focusing on 
macro-economic analysis and forecasting, but has placed less 
emphasis on firm-level analysis. It could also be argued that the lack 
of evaluation culture in Ireland is related to the small size of a 
country.  Some other small countries – most notably Israel – also 
have relatively little tradition of policy evaluation. Other reasons for 
Ireland’s weak tradition of policy evaluation put forward by Ruane 
(2004) included: a weak history of planning; inclusive, negotiated 
agreements which may lead to compromise solutions and a political 
tradition of ‘client-focus’ which may bias against economic 
rationality.   
More recently a number of factors have contributed to an 
increased emphasis on evaluation in Ireland. Most notable has been 
pressure from the EU in response to the scale of allocations under 
the Structural Funds for the period 1989-93 (ESRI, 1997).8 The 
1990s also saw the establishment of the Industrial Evaluation Unit 
(IEU) and more recently the National Development Plan/ 
Community Support Framework (NDP/CSF) Evaluation Unit.  In 
addition, the Irish Evaluation Network was established and held an 
inaugural national conference in 2004.  
There have also been, of late, some encouraging signs to suggest 
that the Irish policymaking community might be moving closer 
towards the creation of an ‘evaluation’ culture. This is highlighted by 
the report to the Minister for Finance by the Expenditure Review 
Central Steering Committee (2004). This notes that a structured 
series of practical training has been delivered to around 110 staff 
involved in the conduct of expenditure reviews. The report also 
indicates that in 2003, the Centre for Management and Organisation 
Development (CMOD), Department of Finance, introduced two 
8 There is a danger that engaging in evaluation as requested to do so by the EU may 
not be the optimal way to evaluate.  As Diez (2002) outlines “…In fact in a great 
number of member states, evaluation practice is exclusively linked to fulfilling EU 
regulations.  Consequently, there is no concern for using evaluation as a process 
directed at knowledge creation and learning and the improvement of regional 
policy” (p. 301).   
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new civil-service wide programmes in public policy analysis. These 
programmes, which are offered in conjunction with the Institute of 
Public Administration and University College Dublin, are available at 
Diploma and Masters level.   
 
 Storey (2000) argues that a prerequisite to any evaluation is that 
clear objectives be specified. More precisely, he argues about the 
“…impossibility of conducting an evaluation in the absence of 
clearly specified objectives for the policy concerned” (p. 177).  In 
fact, he goes so far as to say that in an ideal case “…objectives 
should be specified in a quantitative manner in the form of targets” 
(p. 177).9 In light of this, we review briefly how Irish industrial policy 
has sought to define its objectives in clear measurable ways.  
Looking back at the Industrial Grants Act (1956) it can be seen that 
the objectives for that industrial policy approach were very vague.  
The Act proposed providing grant-support to industries “likely to 
provide employment on a substantial scale, likely to make available 
in the state substantial quantities of the commodity, or likely to 
provide an opportunity for developing an export trade” (Industrial 
Grants Act, 1956).   
5. 
Good and Best 
Practice 
Evaluation 
Approaches: 
Moving 
Beyond the 
Audit Trail 
Similarly, the R&D grants scheme that was operationalised 
through the passing of the Industrial Development Act (1969) had 
equally sketchy and ill-defined objectives. The scheme emphasised 
that R&D grants would have as their main objective “the promotion 
and development of new or improved industrial processes, methods 
or products in the State, and in particular, such processes, methods 
or products as are likely either to involve the use or development of 
local materials, local agricultural produce or local natural resources to 
offer prospects of expansion in existing industries or prospects of 
provision of new industries” (Industrial Development Act, 1969).  It 
is clear that this objective offers no basis for quantification making 
any subsequent evaluation difficult.  
Once again, the ‘Operational Programme for Industrial 
Development’ (1989-1993) had very broad and, we would argue, 
unquantifiable objectives.  In terms of national economic objectives, 
for example, the programme stated: “The maintenance and creation 
of employment and the reduction of unemployment are the primary 
economic policy objectives of Government” (Government of 
Ireland, 1989, p. 5). In terms of achieving this, the key objective of 
industrial development policy was “…to promote the development 
of a strong internationally competitive enterprise sector in Ireland 
comprising both indigenous and non-indigenous companies which 
will make the maximum contribution to self-sustaining employment 
growth” (p. 5).   
9 The 1986 NESC report stated that “a crucial determinant of the success of 
industrial policy in obtaining its objectives will be the effectiveness of the 
monitoring and control mechanisms which are put in place” (p. 275).   
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Even in the most recent statements of industrial policy by the 
Irish government, policy objectives are still only broadly defined. In 
terms of R&D, for example, “Early and decisive action, towards 
developing an ‘Information Society’; where the use of advanced 
information and communication technologies in everyday life is 
widespread” was the broadly stated objective (Forfás, 1996, p. 14).  
At the same time there is clearly recognition of the need for 
quantified objectives. A recent ESG (2004) report, for example, 
recommends the development of Enterprise-led Business Networks.  
In outlining the three fundamental conditions that underpin 
enterprise-led business network initiatives in Ireland, the report 
highlights the importance of clearly specifying objectives: “State 
funding should be made available on the basis of defined and 
independently assessed competitive proposals, designed to meet 
clearly identified and measurable business objectives” (p. 71).10   
BEST-PRACTICE INTERNATIONALLY 
Considerable progress has been made in recent years regarding the 
evaluation of Irish industrial policy initiatives.  While much of this 
has been linked to complying with EU regulations, there is a growing 
awareness of the value of such research in view of increased fiscal 
constraints and the fundamental principles of ‘opportunity cost’ and 
‘accountability’. Nevertheless, in moving forward, it is imperative to 
look beyond the Irish context to best-practice international studies in 
terms of developing appropriate methodologies for future evaluation 
studies (see Mosselman and Prince (2004) and English Partnerships 
(2004) for comprehensive reviews of approaches with the latter 
paying particular attention to assessing the additionality of spatial 
interventions).  
Increasingly, best-practice in evaluation research is pointing 
towards the use of econometric treatment models, e.g. 2-step 
Heckman models, which account for ‘selection’ and ‘assistance’ 
effects (see Roper and Hart, 2003; Wren and Storey, 2002; Roper 
and Hewitt-Dundas, 2001; Roper et al., 2001 and Turok and Raco, 
2000). These approaches use econometric methods to separate the 
‘assistance’ and ‘selection’ effects, i.e. to isolate that element of the 
enhanced performance of assisted companies due to the assistance 
received and that element actually related to the selection of assisted 
companies. Two types of selection bias are usually taken into 
account. First, assisted companies may possess certain characteristics 
(for example, highly motivated, well educated, certain age, certain 
type of background etc.) and may, therefore, be more likely to apply 
for grant assistance in the first instance. A similar point is made by 
10 Moreover, it is not sufficient to define only ‘final’ objectives or anticipated 
outcomes of a particular industrial policy intervention. Policymakers also need to 
define the short term and intermediate objectives of the policy that are to be met 
before reaching the final objectives. McGuinness and Hart (2004) make a related 
point when they emphasise the “…importance of capturing intermediate or end 
outcomes (for example, rising regional productivity) as opposed to simple outputs 
(for example, x number of firms experiencing a rise in productivity)” (p. 841). 
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Turok and Raco (2000) who argue that “Some practitioners believe 
that growth firms are self-selecting because their owners have a 
stronger desire to expand and are more proactive in seeking out 
assistance” (p. 412). The key problem is that, without correcting for 
selection bias, evaluators may overestimate the effect of the 
programme on participants. Second, bias may emanate from the fact 
that development agencies may be more inclined to provide financial 
assistance to certain types of firms than others (e.g. firms whom they 
consider to have the maximum growth potential). More recently, 
McGuinness and Hart (2004) have moved beyond a simple 
‘assistance’ parameter in the multivariate analysis and sought to 
investigate the ways in which different types of assistance (e.g., 
marketing support and R&D grants) and their lagged structures may 
impact upon business performance. In so doing they also undertook 
tests for selection bias among assisted firms receiving particular 
types of assistance.   
The Small Business Research Centre (Kingston University) and 
Warwick University (2004) set out an evaluation plan for the recently 
established Regional Venture Capital Fund (RVCF) programme in 
the English regions co-funded by government.  The study proposes 
to combine an econometric modelling approach (showing how the 
introduction of a new venture capital fund affects the supply and 
demand for equity finance at the regional level) with detailed case 
studies of recipients and non-recipients of RVCFs in order to 
evaluate the net additionality of the RVCF programme. This reflects 
what Curran (1999) describes as a ‘Step Seven’ evaluation in the 
language of Storey (2000) combining quantitative and qualitative 
perspectives. This type of approach is endorsed by Mosselman and 
Prince (2004) in the review of evaluation methods for state aid to 
SMEs. 
Best-practice internationally also focuses on the notion of 
‘behavioural additionality’ (see for example, Georghiou 2004 and the 
SBRC and Warwick University, 2004). The idea here is that upon 
receipt of financial assistance for example, firms may employ a 
different strategy and hence firms behaviour may be affected vis-à-vis 
what was the case prior to government intervention. McEldowney 
(1997), although not using the above term directly also makes 
reference to this possibility when he argues that a particular training 
programme encouraged firms to “…adopt a more structured 
approach to training with a greater emphasis being placed on 
management development measures then before” (p. 186). The 
implication here is that direct economic impacts such as increased 
levels of productivity may not be observed in the time period of the 
evaluation (see, for example, Roper and Hart, 2003) but that the 
behaviour of firms was radically changed in terms of their desire to 
introduce new ways of working and undertake R&D. Interestingly, it 
was the case studies undertaken as part of this study which were able 
to provide the evidence on behavioural additionality and not the 
more formal econometric modelling approach.  It is imperative that 
evaluation methodologies endeavour to capture these changes in 
behaviour. 
In that vein it is important to note that in the case of Ireland, 
Fitzpatrick Associates Economic Consultants (2004) have 
incorporated ‘behavioural additionality’ in their review of the 
Research Technology Initiative (RTI) competitive scheme operated 
by Enterprise Ireland.  The report states that one of the reasons for 
focusing on ‘behavioural additionality’ is to “…recognise the general 
Enterprise Ireland focus on capability as well as capacity” (p. 3). In 
summary, the Fitzpatrick (2004) study found that higher levels of 
behavioural additionality were associated with firms possessing the 
following characteristics: new R&D performers and small and large 
sized companies.   
 
 The overriding conclusion of the paper is that until recently the 
evaluation of Irish industrial policy interventions has been limited, 
especially when one considers first, the growth and proliferation of 
interventionist industrial policy measures over the last fifty years, and 
second, the fact that frequent changes in the focus of industrial 
policy interventions have taken place (e.g., the movement away of 
late from supports for ‘capacity’ to ‘capability’ building) without 
much evidence of longitudinal impact or learning. Nobody could 
argue against the fact that engaging in evaluation is methodologically 
an extremely challenging task.  As discussed in this paper, there is an 
obvious need for, and inherent benefits to engaging in policy 
evaluation. The real difficulty for evaluators is ‘how’ to evaluate. This 
paper has brought together a review of the latest literature on 
evaluation methodology and should form a baseline for future 
evaluation studies in Ireland. The recent establishment of the Irish 
Evaluation Network has the potential to provide an important 
forum for the discussion of such issues. The focus of this paper has 
been on ex post evaluation, which is key to assessing the level of 
‘additionality’ associated with a particular industrial policy 
intervention. However, ex ante evaluation of the likely additional 
impact of government interventions is of equal importance and it is 
our view that greater effort should be invested in this approach (see 
for example, Roper et al., 2004).  
6. 
Conclusion
The methodological rigor of Irish industrial policy evaluations 
has been improving in recent years.  As we have shown in this paper 
international best practice has developed at pace in recent years and 
it is important that the Irish evaluation community continue to 
embrace these best-practice methodologies. It is important to stress 
that discussion in this paper supports the adoption of evaluation 
methodologies that serves both the needs of policymakers and the 
academic community. Too often evaluation methodologies have 
been developed which are so sophisticated that they cannot be 
implemented in practice due to the absence of appropriate data.  
One should learn from past mistakes made internationally in this 
regard (Barnekov et al., 1990 and Shefer and Kaess, 1990). 
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